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Chapter 1 evaluates two policy counterfactuals designed to promote access to community
colleges: tuition subsidies for community college students and easier transition from two- to
four-year colleges. I estimate a structural model of employment and college choices, including
two-year colleges that provide post-secondary education at a lower cost and an opportunity
to transfer to four-year colleges. First, I find that full tuition subsidies at two-year colleges
increase the number of students initially enrolled in two-year colleges by 72.1 percent, and
mostly attract students who would have not attended college otherwise. This increase in two-
year college enrollment translates into an increase of $20,812 in the present value of lifetime
income, which is larger than the average cost of $12,550. However, this does not translate
into an increase in the number of transfers and four-year college degrees completed. Second,
when two-year colleges provide better preparation for students for their transition to four-
year institutions, I find that the number of students initially enrolled in two-year colleges
increases by 19 percent, the transfer rate increases by 27.5 percent, and the completion
rate at four-year colleges increases by 3.1 percent. The average present discounted value of
lifetime income also increases by $16,589.
viii
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of the quality of public schools on students’ enrollment
decisions and their academic achievements in college. I use the National Education Lon-
gitudinal Study of 1988 to create a measure of the quality of high schools by taking the
average of the standardized test scores of students in each school. I estimate a model of
college enrollment and continuation choices in which the quality of high schools could affect
students’ educational outcomes. I find that the quality of high schools has a positive effect
on the probability of receiving a high SAT score and the probability of being admitted to
high-quality colleges. The counterfactual results show that centralizing public education re-
sults in a higher college enrollment rate of students from low-quality school districts. When
a policy imposes a lower bound for high school quality, I find that college enrollment in-
creases by 9.1 percent and college completion increases by 7.8 percent for students attending
the lowest quality quartile schools. Lastly, a 10 percent increase in the ability of students
from the lowest 25th percentile quality schools increases enrollment and completion by 59.5
percent and 33.3 percent, respectively. The counterfactual results suggest that improvement
in the quality of public schools has a modest effect on college enrollment and completion
compared to a direct increase in the ability of the students.
ix
Chapter 1
The Effect of Promoting Access to
Community Colleges on Educational
and Labor Market Outcomes
1.1 Introduction
In 2012, 7.2 million undergraduate students were enrolled in two-year colleges across the
U.S., and 10.6 million were enrolled at four-year colleges. Community colleges have an open
admissions policy and are typically less expensive than four-year colleges. Post-secondary
education at community colleges is an affordable option for higher education and a stepping
stone to a bachelor’s degree. Approximately 41 percent of high school graduates who pursue
higher education initially attended two-year colleges.1
Two types of policies promote access to community colleges to improve college attendance
and degree completion. The first type affects access to higher education by making two-
year colleges more affordable. For example, in 2015 the White House proposed “America’s
College Promise,” which would provide tuition-free community college education to qualified
students. This policy assumes that by completing two years at a community college students
1Digest of Education Statistics 2013, Table 305.10.
1
would earn half of the credits needed for a bachelor’s degree.2 The second type of policy
makes it possible for community colleges to better prepare students for the transition to a
four-year college. One reform would require two-year colleges to offer more courses at a four-
year college level. Another example is a statewide transfer agreement between community
colleges and four-year schools. For example, the California Community Colleges have transfer
agreements with both the California State University and the University of California systems
making it easier for students to transfer from two- to four-year colleges.
Although both types of policies are expected to increase community college enrollment,
it is unclear how increased initial enrollment translates into long-term degree completion and
labor market outcomes. Two-year colleges provide post-secondary education to students who
would not have continued their education otherwise. Community college graduates benefit
from the higher earnings associated with additional years of education. Moreover, a two-year
college student could transfer to a four-year college, earn a bachelor’s degree, and benefit
from even higher expected earnings. At the same time, community colleges could divert
students away from four-year colleges. Two-year college attendance could be associated with
a lower four-year college completion rate relative to four-year college attendance.
To quantify the net effect, I develop and estimate a structural model of students’ ed-
ucational and employment choices. In the model, students can enroll in two- or four-year
colleges, transfer, drop out, or work full-time. The probability of a student completing a
four-year college degree is given as a function of years spent at both two- and four-year
colleges. I estimate the model with simulated method of moments using the data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997.
Given these estimation results, I simulate two policy counterfactuals designed to affect
access to community colleges. Outcomes of interest are enrollment choices, degree completion
rates, and wages. First, I reduce the cost of two-year colleges. Second, I improve the
2Executive Office of the President, “America’s College Promise: A Progress Report on Free Community
College.” 2015.
2
preparation for transition to a four-year college by setting a year at a community college
equivalent to a year at a four-year school for a bachelor’s degree completion probabilities. I
track which group of students attends community colleges and then compare the changes in
their educational choices to baseline outcomes.
The findings show that two-year college subsidies increase the percentage of students
initially enrolled in two-year college by 33.7 percent and 72.1 percent with a subsidy rate of
0.5 and 1, respectively. At the same time, the subsidies decrease the percentage of students
who work initially after high school by 6.9 percent and 13.5 percent with a subsidy rate of
0.5 and 1, respectively. Lower community college tuition mostly attracts students who would
not have attended college otherwise. This increase in two-year college enrollment translates
into an increase in students’ earnings of $10,854 or $20,812 in the average present discounted
value of lifetime income depending on the subsidy rate. Benefits of both subsidies exceed the
costs; however, it does not translate into an increase in the number of transfers and students’
bachelor’s degree attainment. In the second policy counterfactual, when two-year colleges
better prepare students for the transition to a four-year college, the percentage of students
initially enrolled in two-year college increases by 19 percent, the transfer rate increases by
27.5 percent, and the bachelor’s degree completion rate at age 26 increases by 3.1 percent.
As a result, the average present discounted value of lifetime income increases by $16,589.
The counterfactual results suggest that lower costs increase enrollment, but not the number
of students earning four-year degrees. In contrast, when community colleges better prepare
students for the transition to four-year colleges, the increase in enrollment is larger than in
the half-subsidy case, helping more students attend community colleges to eventually earn
bachelor’s degrees.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related literature.
Section 2.2 describes the data and descriptive statistics. Section 2.3 develops the structural
model. Section 1.5 discusses estimation strategy. Section 1.6 presents the estimation results
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and the model fit. Section 1.7 discusses the policy counterfactuals and welfare analysis.
Section 2.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Researchers often separate the effects of community colleges into the democratization effect
and the diversion effect. The former affects two-year college students who would not have
attended college otherwise, whereas the latter affects two-year college students who would
have attended a four-year college otherwise. Rouse (1995) uses the distance to two-year and
four-year college and the average state two- and four-year college tuition as instrumental
variables. By comparing the coefficients on two- and four-year attendance, she finds that
the magnitude of the democratization effect is larger than that of the diversion effect. Long
and Kurlaender (2009) use the propensity score matching method controlling for students’
educational expectations. Recent papers explore case studies in specific states to estimate
the effect of community colleges on educational outcomes. Goodman et al (2015) exploit SAT
score thresholds in Georgia and find that the diversion effect on bachelor’s degree attainment
exists for those who were drawn to two-year colleges. Denning (2014) uses the expansion
of community college taxing district in Texas as an instrumental variable and reports that
a $1,000 decrease in tuition results in 7.1 percentage points increase in community college
enrollment. Local average treatment effects are difficult to compare since the treatment
groups are different. To compare the effects of policies promoting access to community
colleges on various outcomes, I estimate a structural model of employment and schooling.
The model used in this paper is closely related to the discrete choice models in which
individuals choose between schooling and employment options. Keane and Wolpin (1997)
use a dynamic structural model to study the schooling and occupational choices of young
men. Arcidiacono (2005) estimates a structural model including application, enrollment and
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college major choices. Epple, Romano and Sieg (2006) and Fu (2014) estimate structural
equilibrium models to understand tuition, applications, admissions, and enrollment deci-
sions jointly. Other papers use structural models including community colleges as one of
the schooling options. Johnson (2013) finds that tuition subsidies have larger effect on ed-
ucational attainment than an equal amount of the loan limit increase. A tuition subsidy of
$1,500 to two- and four-year colleges increases overall college enrollment by 6.4 percentage
points and bachelor’s degree completion rate by 5.3 percentage points. Trachter (2015) re-
ports that a 15 percent decrease in two-year college tuition results in an increase in two-year
college enrollment from 15.7 percent to 26.6 percent. At the same time four-year college
enrollment drops from 27.4 percent to 17.3 percent.
To understand the educational and employment patterns observed in the data, I ex-
amine the returns to post-secondary education. Researchers have documented that college
education is associated with higher earnings. In particular, researchers exploited exogenous
variation to estimate the returns to schooling including two-year colleges. Such variations
include distances to two- and four-year colleges (Kane and Rouse (1995)) and an admissions
threshold (Zimmerman (2014)). Kane and Rouse find that an associate’s degree is associated
with 7 percent higher annual earnings than high school graduates, and a bachelor’s degree
is associated with 28 percent higher annual earnings than high school graduates. Zimmer-
man uses a regression discontinuity to report that if a student is just above the admissions
threshold at a public university in Florida, earnings increase by 22 percent between 8 and
14 years after high school graduation.
Community colleges serve as a stepping stone to a bachelor’s degree through an oppor-
tunity to transfer to a four-year institution. A statewide articulation policy facilitates this
transfer process for community college students. Researchers have investigated the effect of
this policy on students’ educational outcomes. Anderson et al (2006) find that a statewide
articulation policy has little effect on students’ transfer rates, but they acknowledge that
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they focus on small number of states and these policies may need time to take effect on the
transfer rates. Roksa and Keith (2008) argue that statewide articulation policies should be
evaluated by outcomes that occur after students transfer to four-year institutions such as
number of credits transferred, time to a bachelor’s degree, and completion of a bachelor’s
degree. Authors report that statewide articulation policies have no effect on relevant out-
comes, but they explain that this outcome could be due to the data limitations and variation
in articulation policies among states.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by comparing the effects of two pol-
icy counterfactuals, which promote access to community colleges. I quantify the effects of
subsidizing tuition at community colleges and providing smoother transitions to four-year
institutions in one model. This paper reports the effects on enrollment at two- and four-
year colleges, a bachelor’s degree attainment, and labor market outcomes and the group of
students affected by each type of policy.
1.3 Data
I use the panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The
NLSY97 is a longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of youth ranging in age
from 12 to 18 at the end of 1996. The NLSY97 surveyed 9,021 youth born between 1980 and
1984. I use the data from round 1 (1997-1998) through round 15 (2011-2012). In round 15,
respondents ranged in age from 26 to 32. The NLSY97 has variables on schooling including
a type of college, an enrollment status, and a four-year college degree status. I obtain
information on demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age. In addition, I
have information on region, family income, parents’ education, and the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) math-verbal percentile score. Table 1.4 summarizes
the variables and the data sources. I use the school enrollment status on October each year
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to determine whether an individual is enrolled at a two- or four-year college. The highest
degree received prior to the start of each academic school year is used to determine whether
or not an individual has a four-year college degree. The ASVAB math-verbal percentile score
is used as a measure of ability. I obtain gross household income in thousands of dollars when
each respondent was 18 years old. Total income from wages and salary each year is selected
to construct the wage profile.
I restrict the sample to male high school graduates between 18 and 26 years old. I focus
on males because of their strong labor market participation as the model considers only
their employment choices before 26. I choose age 26 as the end of the sample, because
few people complete a four-year college degree after 26. The completion rate at four-year
colleges increases by only 0.01 percentage points between ages 25 and 26. I exclude high
school dropouts and observations with missing data on the ASVAB math-verbal percentile
score. The final sample size is 751 with 6,008 individual-year observations.
To complement the NLSY97 wage data, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 (NLSY79). Since the NLSY97 sample is relatively young, it has limited wage data after
college graduation. The most recent round 16 (2013-2014) interviewed youth of ages from
28 to 34. It is difficult to estimate the expected lifetime income and to project out into an
individual’s retirement age of 65. I estimate the expected lifetime income using the data
from the NLSY79 and combine it with the NLSY97.
For college-level data, I use the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).
The IPEDS contains surveys conducted by the U.S. Department of Education’s National
Center for Education Statistics. It reports information on enrollment, program completion,
graduation rates, faculty and staff, finances, institutional prices, and student financial aid.
I use the tuition data to compute state-average tuition of two- and four-year colleges. I use
the state of residence in high school to assign the tuition cost to a student.3 In addition, I
3 Due to the data availability, I aggregate the states into four census regions.
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compute state-average instructional expenditure for two- and four-year colleges that I use in
the cost-benefit analysis.
Figure 1.1 shows the proportion of school and work choices over time for the sample.
Initially, 15.45 percent of high school graduates attend two-year colleges and 35.55 percent
attend four-year colleges. The remaining 49 percent of high school graduates join the labor
market. Students who initially attend two- and four-year colleges enter the labor market
after a few periods. Labor market participation increases gradually and reaches 86.42 percent
at age 26. To explain the steady increase in work and a decrease in schooling over time, one
year of schooling would be associated with an increase in future earnings which compensates
for the opportunity cost of schooling.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of key variables in the model. I group the
full sample into three groups – a work, a two-year, and a four-year – based on students’
initial choices. As the level of schooling increases, from the first column to the third column,
the ASVAB math-verbal percentile score, the log wage at age 26, and the family income
are higher. The proportion of non-Hispanic and non-black students is higher at four-year
schools than at two-year schools and for high school graduates. Initial enrollment choice
is correlated with the number of years spent at two- or four-year colleges and a bachelor’s
degree completion. Those who enrolled at a two-year college spend 2.76 years at a community
college and 0.84 years at a four-year college. Those who enrolled at a four-year college spend
4.21 years at a four-year institution and 0.25 years at a two-year institution. Those who
choose not to go to college spend less than a year at either type of college. As a result,
the fraction of a bachelor’s degree holder for initial two-year college attendees is 17 percent
compared to 60 percent for initial four-year college attendees. These differences show that
student characteristics are different at two- and four-year colleges, and two types of schools
would prepare students differently for a four-year college degree completion.
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Table 1.3 shows the Mincer regression estimates of the NLSY79 sample. I use the esti-
mates to construct the present discounted value of lifetime income and use it as the terminal
value as a function of number of years spent at college, a four-year college degree, work
experiences, and race.
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Overview
Individual i chooses from options j ∈ {2yr, 4yr, work} at t ≤ T . Individuals can either enroll
at two-year or four-year colleges, work full-time, drop out, or transfer between schooling
options. At t = T + 1, everyone enters the labor market. I assume that everyone works
after t = T + 1, and receives a present discounted value (PDV) of lifetime income based on
the total number of years spent at college, a bachelor’s degree status (BA), and student’s
ability. The model allows 38 choice combinations. Only choice restriction of the model is
that students no longer make decisions after getting a four-year degree. Four-year college
completion probabilities depend on the number of years spent at two- and four-year college
and a student’s ability. Students have correct beliefs about the probabilities of completing
a four-year college.
1.4.2 Preferences
Utility of a schooling option j ∈ {2yr, 4yr} at time t is
Ujt = U¯jt (Xit, Zj; βj) + jt
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Ujt = β0j + β1jAi + β2jtuitionj + β3j1 [Djt−1 = 0] + β4j1 [typei = 2] + jt (1.1)
where Ai is the ability measure, and tuitionj is the average tuition level at school j in i’s
census region. 1 [Djt−1 = 0] is an indicator which equals 1 if an individual i attended different
type of school at t−1. β3j captures the transfer costs. Unobserved type typei = {1, 2} affects
the intercept of the utility. I assume that jt follows a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution.
This utility function allows for different parameters for two- or four-year colleges.
Utility of working full-time (j = work) at time t is
Uwork,t = ρ ln (Wt (Xit;α)) + work,t
Wt (Xit;α) represents the annual wage at t as a function of individual characteristics. I
assume that work,t follows a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution. Wage function is
Wit = exp (α0 + α1Ai + α2s2yr,t + α3s4yr,t + α4BAit + µt) (1.2)
where Ai is the ability measure and sjt is the years of schooling spent at college type j until
t including choice at t
(
sjt =
∑t
t′=1Djt′
)
. BAit is a dummy variable which equals 1 if i has
a bachelor’s degree at the beginning of t.
1.4.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
It is likely that there exist information only observed by a student when making the decisions
in the model. Example of such information is the levels of aspiration or motivation. To
account for such information I allow two unobserved types, typei ∈ {1, 2}. Type-specific
intercepts affect the utility of schooling option j. I assume that the unobserved type affects
the wage equation and probability of BA completion indirectly through schooling choices.
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Unobserved types could explain variation in choices of students who have similar observed
characteristics.
1.4.4 Probability of Four-year College Degree Completion
Students attending four-year colleges face four-year college degree completion probabilities.
The probability of receiving a BA degree depend on ability, and years of schooling at two-
and four-year colleges. The probability of receiving a BA degree at time t+ 1 is
Pr (BAt+1 = 1|D4yr,t = 1)
= Λ (λ0 + λ1Ai + λ2s2yr,t + λ3s4yr,t) · 1 [s4yr,t ≥ min4yr] (1.3)
where Λ (·) is the logistic function. As in the wage equation, Ai is the ability measure and
sjt is the years of schooling spent at college j until t including choice at t. Students need
at least min4yr years at 4yr to graduate four-year college. I assume that students need to
attend at least two years at four-year colleges to complete, min4yr = 2. Coefficients on years
of schooling, λ2 and λ3, determine how two types of colleges contribute to completing a BA
degree. Estimates would be similar if there is no difference in two- and four-year college’s
academic preparation for a BA degree attainment.
1.4.5 Decision Problem
The value of each option j at t, the alternative-specific value function is
Vjt (Ωt) = Ujt + βE [V (Ωt+1) |Ωt, Djt = 1]
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where
V (Ωt) = max
j
{Vjt (Ωt)}
For t ≤ T , individual i chooses among options j ∈ {2yr, 4yr, work}. Djt = 1 if i chooses
option j at t. If i receives a four-year degree (BAit = 1) then i starts working in t + 1. For
t > T , working is an absorbing state, and I assume that everyone works until Tretire. A
terminal value function PDVT+1 (ΩT+1) determines the present discounted value of lifetime
income associated with working from T + 1 to Tretire. To complement the wage data in the
NLSY97, I use the NLSY79 to compute the wage profiles of individuals over 26.
A student’s choice depends on various model parameters. If the coefficient on tuition
is high it is less desirable to attend high-tuition schooling option, a four-year college. If
the coefficient on previous choice indicator variable increases, I would observe less transfers
between schooling options and between school and work choices and more persistence in
two- and four-year colleges. For the probabilities of BA completion, the coefficients on the
number of years spent at two- and four-year colleges determine the effect of years spent at
two- and four-year colleges on a BA completion probability. If the coefficient on two-year is
large enough relative to the coefficient on four-year then enrollment at a community college
would be higher since two-year attendance does not hurt the chance of BA completion.
The state space is
Ωt =
{
{sjt−1}j , BAit, Djt−1, typei, Xi
}
Evolution of the number of years spent at college j, sjt between t−1 and t is deterministic
depending on Djt. The number of years spent at college j evolves as
sjt = sjt−1 +Djt
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for j ∈ {2yr, 4yr}. Probabilities shown in (1.3) determine the BA degree outcome BAit.
Djt−1 is the previous period’s choice. Unobserved type typei and observed characteristics Xi
including the ability measure remain the same over time. In summary, individual i computes
alternative-specific value functions at t and chooses option j with the highest value given
Ωt =
{
{sjt−1}j , BAit, Djt−1, typei, Xi
}
. Individual i repeats this decision process until t = T .
1.4.6 Dynamic Problem Solution
I solve the dynamic model backwards starting from the last period T . At t = T , the value
of option j is
VjT (ΩT ) = UjT + βE [PDVT+1 (ΩT+1) |ΩT , DjT = 1]
where PDVT+1 (ΩT+1) is the present discounted value of lifetime income working from T + 1
to Tretire. Expectation is taken over the future degree outcome BAi,T+1.
At t = T − 1, the value of option j is
VjT−1 (ΩT−1) = V¯jT−1 (ΩT−1) + jT−1
= UjT−1 + βE [V (ΩT ) |ΩT−1, DjT−1 = 1]
where V (ΩT ) = maxj [VjT (ΩT )].
Rust (1987) showed that this expectation expression has a closed form solution. I can
rewrite the expectation term as
E [V (ΩT ) |ΩT−1, DjT−1 = 1]
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= E
γ + ln
∑
j
exp
(
V¯jT (ΩT )
) |ΩT−1, DjT−1 = 1

=
∑
BAi,T
γ + ln
∑
j
exp
(
V¯jT (ΩT )
)Pr (BAi,T )
where γ is the Euler constant. I repeat the process until t = 1. Once I have computed the
expectation term, I can write choice probabilities as
Pr (Djt = 1|Ωt) =
exp
(
V¯jt (Ωt)
)
∑
j exp
(
V¯jt (Ωt)
)
I use these choice probabilities to simulate data in the estimation.
1.5 Estimation
1.5.1 Simulated Method of Moments
I estimate the model with simulated method of moments allowing for unobserved types
of individuals. Estimation is also feasible using maximum likelihood, and the unobserved
types can be integrated out using the EM algorithm. Due to computational convenience,
I choose simulated method of moments. I estimate three sets of parameters in the model:
utility parameters including unobserved type parameters, wage parameters, and probability
of completion parameters. Table 1.5 lists the parameters of the model. I jointly estimate the
unobserved type probability parameter pi1 and the type-specific intercepts in utility functions,
{β4,2yr, β4,4yr} with other utility parameters.
Simulated method of moments estimator is
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θˆSMM = arg min
θ
[msim (θ)−mdata]
′
W [msim (θ)−mdata]
where mdata is the M -dimensional vector of data moments and msim (θ) is the M -dimensional
vector of simulated moments given the vector of parameters θ. W is a M ×M weighting
matrix. I choose W to be the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the empirical
moments. Before the estimation process, I first compute the data moments, mdata and com-
pute the weighting matrix W by taking the inverse of the variance matrix of the moments.
Using the solution from subsection 1.4.6, I generate simulated data given parameter values
θ. Simulated method of moments estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal with
variance
(
1 + 1
S
)(∂msim (θ)
∂θ
)′
W
(
∂msim (θ)
∂θ
)−1
The following is the list of moments used in estimation (number of moments in paren-
theses). There are 39 moments and 22 parameters.
• proportion making choice j in each period t = [1, 8] (16)
• average number of years spent at two-year colleges for each period t = [2, 9] (8)
• average number of years spent at four-year colleges for each period t = [2, 9] (8)
• a four-year college degree status for t = [3, T + 1] (7)
1.5.2 Identification
I identify the utility function parameters by exploiting variation in school and work choices
each period including switching between two- and four-year schools, dropping out of college,
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and returning to college from work. To identify the parameter on tuition level, I assume that
tuition level depends only on student’s state of residence in high school which is independent
of unobserved type. The parameter on previous schooling choice is identified by persistence
of schooling choices. If the magnitude of the parameter is relatively small, I would observe
more switching between two- and four-year colleges.
Unlike the utility, I observe a four-year college degree status and labor market outcomes
in the data. However, students select themselves into different type of school, and the
selection problem affects the degree status as well. It is difficult to assume that unobserved
heterogeneity affecting schooling outcomes are independent of labor market outcomes. The
model allows for an unobserved heterogeneity to account for the selection problem. I assume
that an unobserved type affects a four-year college degree outcome and wages indirectly
through schooling choices. Individuals observe their types, but the schools and employers
do not observe them. This assumption is stronger than allowing a four-year college degree
and wages to directly depend on the types. Under this assumption, I can identify a four-
year college degree probability and wage function parameters separately from the utility
parameters. Unobserved type parameters are identified by using variation in choices of
students who have similar observed characteristics.
1.6 Results
In this section, I present the estimates of the model and evaluate the model fit. Table 1.6
displays the utility parameter estimates results. The magnitude of a parameter on ability is
higher for four-year colleges: 0.167 for two-year and 0.510 for four-year colleges. The param-
eter on tuition is -0.146 for two-year and -2.669 for four-year colleges. Subsidizing tuition
would have a larger effect on four-year than on two-year college enrollment. An individual
of type 1 is more likely to attend college than a type 2 individual, holding other individual
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characteristics constant. Moreover, the negative utility associated with attending a two-year
college is 10 times larger than that of a four-year college: -2.363 for two-year and -0.231 for
four-year colleges. Switching cost is positive for two-year colleges. It captures the fact that
community colleges have an open admissions policy. The parameter on switching to four-
year colleges is also positive, but it is not statistically significant. I use the estimates from
the wage regression (1.2) separately outside the model using the NLSY97 as shown in Table
1.2. Similarly I estimate the probability of BA completion equation (1.3) separately using a
logit model. Table 1.7 presents the BA completion functions estimates. The parameters on
years spent at two- and four-year college are 0.6102 and 0.9795, respectively. For a student
who has an ASVAB percentile score of 60, two years at a community college, and two years
at a four-year college would have a 28 percent chance of obtaining a BA degree. The same
student with 0 years at a community college and four years at a four-year college would have
a 45 percent probability to receive a BA degree. The number of years spent at two- and
four-year colleges affect the BA completion probabilities differently.
Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 display the students’ schooling and work choices over time for the
actual data and simulated data from the model. The model fits the overall choice patterns
of the NLSY97 data. Figure 1.5 reports the BA degree attainment. The model overpredicts
BA completion rate after t = 5. This is partly due to the fact that the probability of 4-year
college degree has the logistic functional form. Figure 1.6 shows the average number of years
spent at two- and four-year colleges. Both years spent at two- and four-year colleges matches
well.
1.7 Counterfactuals
In this section, I discuss two policy counterfactuals designed to influence access to commu-
nity colleges. First, I reduce the cost to attend two-year colleges. Second, I improve the
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preparation for transition to a four-year college by setting a year spent at community col-
leges equivalent to a year spent at four-year colleges for the probability of a four-year college
degree completion. Given the parameter estimates and randomly drawn shocks, I forward
simulate schooling and work choices, degree attainment, and labor market outcomes.
1.7.1 Two-year College Subsidy
I simulate data from the model in which I reduce the tuition of community colleges. Table
1.8 summarizes the counterfactual results. The percentage of students initially enrolled in
two-year college increases by 33.7 percent when the subsidy rate is 0.5. Figures 1.7 and 1.9
show that the half-tuition subsidy increases two-year college enrollment and decreases the
proportion of students who would have worked otherwise.
When I increase the subsidy rate to 1, i.e., free community college, the percentage of
students initially enrolled in two-year college increases by 72.1 percent. Full subsidy draws
more students to two-year colleges; hence, the average number of years spent at four-year
colleges drops more than the half-tuition case.
This policy mostly affects the students who are on the margin of working and attending
two-year colleges and does not have a large effect on four-year college students. Percentage of
students who transfer from two-year colleges to four-year colleges decreases from 38 percent
to 33 percent. Transfer rate drops because most of the students induced to community
colleges are the students who would have not attended college at all. Hence, the increase
in enrollment does not translate into an increase in four-year college degree completion. As
a result of such enrollment change, the four-year college degree completion rate slightly
decreases by 0.7 percent and 3.5 percent depending on the subsidy rate. Lastly, these
changes in the enrollment and the completion affect the labor market outcomes measured
by the present discounted value of lifetime income. Table 1.8 shows that the average PDV
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of lifetime income increases by $10,854 (subsidy rate = 0.5) and $20,812 (subsidy rate = 1)
due to the increase in overall years in college.
Proportions in choices are not sufficient to see how students change their schooling choices
compared to the baseline. I present the transitions in years of schooling in Table 1.9. Diag-
onal elements represent the percentages of students who attended the same years at colleges
under the baseline and counterfactuals. For example, the second row of Table 1.9 (a) shows
that 50.5 percent of students who spent a year at a two-year college make the same choice
and 36.8 percent attend two years at community colleges under the first counterfactual when
the subsidy rate is 0.5. Students, who initially attended community colleges, stay longer in
community colleges under this counterfactual. In Table 1.9 (b), among the four-year college
students, who spent four years, 12.3 percent switched from three years at four-year institutes.
When grouping the students based on the years spent at four-year colleges, those who spent
one year at four-year colleges (i.e., four-year drop outs) tend to switch to two-year colleges
more often than the other group of students who spent more than two years at four-year
colleges.
Elements in the right upper side of the diagonal elements represent the students who
spend more years at community colleges than the baseline. In particular, the first row shows
that 19.5 percent of students who did not attend any college in the baseline now attend more
than a year at community colleges.
Transition of years spent at colleges for a full-tuition subsidy is shown in Table 1.10.
Overall pattern of the transition is the same, but the size of the transition increases. Differ-
ence between the half- and full-tuition rate shows that when a subsidy rate is 0.5 those who
spent four years at four-year colleges remained the same for 84.9 percent, whereas under the
full-tuition subsidy, the same group of students remained the same for 79.5 percent.
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1.7.2 Improvement in Transition to Four-year Colleges
Statewide transfer agreements between community colleges and four-year colleges allow stu-
dents to transfer their two-year school credits to four-year colleges without depreciation.
These types of policies would increase two-year college enrollment and transfers to four-year
colleges. In particular, I simulate a model in which I set the parameter on years spent at
a two-year college to be the same as the parameter on years spent at a four-year college in
the probability of a four-year college completion equation (1.3). I change the parameter on
years spent at two-year colleges to 0.9795 (λ3) from the baseline estimate of 0.6102 (λ2). All
other parameters remain the same as the baseline model estimates. Then the probability of
receiving a four-year college degree at time t+ 1 becomes
Pr (BAt+1 = 1|D4yr,t = 1)
= Λ (λ0 + λ1Ai + λ3 (s2yr,t + s4yr,t)) · 1 [s4yr,t ≥ min4yr] (1.4)
Figure 1.15 displays that when a year spent at two-year college is equivalent to a year
spent at four-year college for BA completion, students tend to attend two-year colleges more,
and the relative size of the change is larger than the changes of a half-tuition subsidy and
smaller than the changes of a full-tuition subsidy. The proportion in two-year colleges re-
mains relatively high until t = 6 then drops to the baseline outcome as seen in Figure 1.15.
Figure 1.17 shows that the proportion of students who work decreases compared to the base-
line outcome. Table 1.8 reports that the percentage of students initially enrolled in two-year
college increases by 19 percent. Fraction of students transferring from community colleges
to four-year colleges increases from 38 percent to 42 percent, and the a four-year college de-
gree completion rate at age 26 increases by 3.1 percent. This counterfactual produces more
four-year college degree holders because attending two-year colleges does not hurt students’
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chances of getting a four-year college degree.
Table 1.11 presents the transition in college enrollment. This counterfactual increases
the average number of years spent at two-year colleges, but the group of students induced to
community colleges are different from the tuition subsidy counterfactual. For example, 19.5
percent of those who spent zero years at community colleges switch to two-year colleges more
than a year in the first counterfactual. But in the second counterfactual, only 6.7 percent of
the same group switch to community colleges.
1.7.3 Welfare Analysis
In this section I perform a welfare analysis by comparing the costs and the benefits of both
counterfactuals.
For the first counterfactual, the total cost is
∑
i
∑
t
βt−1 {tuition2yr,i · subsidy rate2yr · 1 [D2yr,it = 1]}
where I set subsidy rate2yr equal to either 0.5 or 1. I calculate the total benefit by computing
the change in the present discounted value of lifetime income.
For the second counterfactual, it is not obvious how to compute the cost of improving
preparation for transition to a four-year institution. I use the instructional expenditure per
student as a measure of the cost outside of the model. Suppose I spend the same amount
of instructional expenditure to a student at a community college as a student at a four-year
college to make a year at a two-year school equivalent to a year at a four-year school. The
total cost is
∑
i
∑
t
βt−1 {∆expenditure per studenti · 1 [D2yr,it = 1]}
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where ∆expenditure per studenti is the difference in the instructional expenditure per stu-
dent at two- and four-year institutions. The total benefit is the change in PDV of life-
time income of students. The instructional expenditure per student obtained from the
IPEDS for two- and four-year schools are $1,350 and $4,023. The difference of $2,673 is
the ∆expenditure per studenti.
The last two rows of Table 1.8 present the costs and benefits of the counterfactuals. A
half-tuition subsidy increases the percentage of students initially enrolled in two-year college
by 33.7 percent, but decreases the four-year college degree attainment slightly. The average
PDV of lifetime income increases by $10,854, which is larger than the average cost of $4,721.
Since the PDV of lifetime income depends on the number of years spent at a college and
a BA degree, this increase is due to an increase in years spent at two-year schools. The
increase in the benefit due to an increase in years in a college is larger than the decrease in
benefit due to a decrease in BA degree attainment.
When a subsidy rate increases to 1, the percentage of students initially enrolled in two-
year college increases by 72.1 percent. Both changes in the enrollment and the degree
attainment result in higher average PDV of lifetime income by $20,812. When the subsidy
rate is higher, enrollment at a two-year school increases and the average cost goes up to
$12,549, but this cost is still lower than the benefit.
For the second counterfactual, the percentage of students initially enrolled in two-year
college increases by 19 percent, and a BA degree attainment increases by 3.1 percent. Both
increases in the enrollment and the degree completion result in an increase in the average
PDV of lifetime income by $16,589, which is five times larger than the average cost. As
discussed earlier, the instructional expenditure per student is not included in the model.
In other words, changing the expenditure does not change the model simulation outcomes.
Whether it is the increase in the expenditure or some other programs to improve the com-
munity college education, when the average cost is $14,814, the cost would equal the benefit.
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This amount is larger than the half-tuition subsidy cost, $10,754, and smaller than the full-
tuition subsidy cost, $20,812. Any amount of expenditure below $14,814 would make the
benefit greater than the cost.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates students’ college and employment choices and evaluates how two poli-
cies promoting access to community colleges affect students’ educational and labor market
outcomes. I develop and estimate a structural model of work and college choices, including
community colleges, which offer post-secondary education at a lower cost. Students can
enroll at two- or four-year colleges, transfer, drop out, or work full-time. The probability of
a student completing a four-year college degree is given as a function of years spent at both
two- and four-year colleges. I estimate the model with simulated method of moments using
the data from the NLSY97.
The NLSY97 data shows a steady increase in labor market participation and a decrease
in college enrollment from for individuals age 18 to 26. The model developed in this study
can reproduce these patterns including the number of years spent at two- and four-year
colleges. Given the estimation results, I evaluate two policy counterfactuals designed to
promote access to community colleges: tuition subsidies for community colleges and easier
transition from two- to four-year colleges.
The findings show that two-year college subsidies increase the percentage of students
initially enrolled in two-year college by 33.7 percent and 72.1 percent with a subsidy rate of
0.5 and 1, respectively. At the same time, these subsidies decrease the percentage of students
who work initially after high school by 6.9 percent and 13.5 percent with a subsidy rate of
0.5 and 1, respectively. Lower community college tuition attracts students who would not
have attended college otherwise. This increase in enrollment at two-year colleges translates
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into an increase in student earnings of $10,854 and $20,812 in the average PDV of lifetime
income; however, it does not translate into increases in the number of transfers and four-
year college degrees. When two-year colleges better prepare students for the transition to
four-year colleges, the percentage of students initially enrolled in two-year college increases
by 19 percent, the transfer rate increases by 27.5 percent, and the four-year college degree
completion rate at age 26 increases by 3.1 percent. As a result, the average PDV of lifetime
income increases by $16,589.
These counterfactual results suggest that lower costs increase enrollment but decrease
the number of students transferring and earning four-year college degrees. In comparison,
when community colleges better prepare students for the transition to four-year colleges,
the increase in community college enrollment is larger than in the half-subsidy case, helping
more students attend community colleges to eventually earn a four-year college degree.
Welfare analysis results show that subsidizing tuition at community colleges and provid-
ing easier transition to four-year colleges increase the present discounted value of lifetime
income and in all cases the benefits exceed the costs. The second counterfactual result
should be carefully interpreted as it is difficult to quantify the cost of better preparation for
transition to a four-year college. I choose instructional expenditure per student to measure
the cost of such policy. At $14,814, the cost would equal the benefit; this value is larger
than the half-tuition subsidy cost and smaller than the full-tuition subsidy cost. These two
counterfactuals affect different groups of students. Tuition subsidies attract those who are
on the margin between two-year college entry and high school graduation; hence the result-
ing increase in enrollment does not increase the number of students who transfer and earn
four-year college degrees. In contrast, when a year at a community college is equivalent to
a year at a four-year college for degree completion, the number of students transferring and
completing a four-year college degree increase slightly.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Sample Means
Initial Choice
Work 2-year 4-year Total
ASVAB percentile score 48.32 55.67 74.42 58.74
[25.44] [25.02] [21.92] [26.93]
Total years at 2-year college at age 26 0.66 2.76 0.25 0.84
[1.10] [1.61] [0.76] [1.38]
Total years at 4-year college at age 26 0.59 0.84 4.21 1.91
[1.35] [1.38] [1.65] [2.25]
4-year college degree status at age 26 0.07 0.17 0.60 0.28
[0.26] [0.38] [0.49] [0.45]
Log wage at age 26 9.67 9.74 9.87 9.76
[0.78] [0.76] [0.76] [0.78]
Family income (in 2000$) 58872.5 72182.05 81623.75 69016.96
[54098.68] [46191.18] [70613.62] [60302.27]
Race: non-Hispanic and non-black 0.58 0.65 0.73 0.64
Observations 368 116 267 751
Notes: NLSY97 sample of male high school graduates. Columns represent individuals’ initial
choices. Standard deviations are shown in brackets.
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Table 1.2: Wage Regression: NLSY97 Sample
Estimates Standard Error
Ability 0.0016 0.0002
Years at 2 year 0.0470 0.0063
Years at 4 year -0.0445 0.0052
4-year college degree 0.2505 0.0232
Constant 7.8778 0.0175
Observations 38,421
R2 0.2002
Notes: Regression result for the NLSY97 sample between age 18 and 26. This is different
from the wage regression using the earlier survey (NLSY79) sample between age 26 to 65.
Dependent variable is a log wage. Ability is measured by the ASVAB math-verbal percentile
score. Independent variables include age dummy variables.
Table 1.3: Wage Regression: NLSY79 Sample
Estimates Standard Error
Work experience 0.049 0.002
Work experience squared -0.001 0.000
Race: black -0.285 0.013
Race: non-Hispanic and non-black 0.119 0.012
4-year college degree 0.445 0.020
Constant 9.596 0.014
Observations 40,302
R2 0.1656
Notes: NLSY79 sample. Dependent variable is log wage. Independent variables includes
dummies for number of years at college (1 to 8). Coefficients on number of years at college
range from 0.115 to 0.288, and all estimates are statistically significant at 99 percent level.
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Table 1.4: List of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Source
School and work choices (Dj1, . . . , DjT ) NLSY97
Degree status (BA1, . . . , BAT+1) NLSY97
Family income NLSY97
Parents’ education NLSY97
ASVAB math-verbal percentile score NLSY97
Race, gender, age, census region NLSY97
Tuition (2- and 4-year state average) IPEDS
Instructional expenditure per student (2- and 4-year state average) IPEDS
Wage between 18 and 26 NLSY97
PDV lifetime income (wage profile from 26 to 65) NLSY79
Notes: NLSY79: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979; NLSY97: National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth 1997; IPEDS: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.
Table 1.5: List of Parameters
Variable Parameter
Utility (j ∈ {2yr, 4yr}) constant β0j
ability β1j
tuition β2j
transfer cost β3j
type 2 β4j
wage ρ
Pr (BA = 1) constant λ0
ability λ1
years at 2-year λ2
years at 4-year λ3
Wage constant α0
ability α1
years at 2-year α2
years at 4-year α3
4-year degree α4
Pr (type = 1) probability of type 1 (pi1 = 1− pi2) pi1
Notes: Total number of parameters is 22.
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Table 1.6: Estimation Result: Utility
Estimates Standard Error
Utility 2-year
constant -0.267 0.040
ability 0.167 0.003
tuition -0.146 0.068
switch 0.903 0.334
type 2 -2.335 0.630
Utility 4-year
constant 2.774 0.472
ability 0.510 0.018
tuition -2.669 0.092
switch 0.203 0.801
type 2 -0.238 0.061
Notes: NLSY97 sample. Tuition in thousands of dollars. A dummy variable, type 2 equals to
1 if an unobserved type is 2 and 0 otherwise. Ability is measured by the ASVAB percentile
score. Estimates obtained using simulated method of moments.
Table 1.7: Estimation Result: 4-year College Degree Completion
Estimates Standard Error
Ability 0.0074 0.0008
Years at 2-year 0.6102 0.0311
Years at 4-year 0.9795 0.0201
Constant -4.5392 0.0909
Notes: NLSY97 sample who attended at least 2 years at four-year colleges. Ability is mea-
sured by the ASVAB percentile score.
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Table 1.8: Counterfactual Results
CF1: 2-year college CF2:
Baseline Tuition subsidy Easier transition
simulation Half Full to 4-year college
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% 2-year at age 18-20 0.142 0.190 0.245 0.169
% 4-year at age 18-20 0.345 0.333 0.312 0.335
% work at age 18-20 0.513 0.477 0.443 0.496
% transfer 0.385 0.356 0.331 0.422
Average number of years at 2-year at 26 0.784 1.061 1.417 1.120
Average number of years at 4-year at 26 1.828 1.780 1.723 1.724
4-year college degree completion at 26 0.378 0.376 0.365 0.390
Average PDV of lifetime income (000$) 605.091 615.945 625.903 621.680
∆Average PDV of lifetime income (000$) - 10.854 20.812 16.589
Average cost (Total cost/Nobs, 000$) - 4.722 12.550 2.993
Notes: Column (1) shows the baseline simulation. Column (2) and (3) show counterfactual
1 result with a subsidy rate = 0.5 and a subsidy rate = 1 (i.e., free community college).
Column (4) displays counterfactual 2 result with ∆expenditure= $2,673. Transfer defined
as individuals who attend 2-year college at either t = 1 or t = 2 and attend at least a year
at 4-year college afterward.
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Table 1.9: Counterfactual 1: Transition of Total Years at College
(a) Years at 2-year Colleges at 26
Counterfactual 1
Years 0 1 2 3 3+
Baseline
0 91.0 7.0 2.0
1 1.1 50.5 36.8 10.5 1.1
2 46.6 43.1 10.3
3 3.3 46.7 50.0
(b) Years at 4-year Colleges at 26
Counterfactual 1
Years 0 1 2 3 4 5
Baseline
0 97.2 2.1 0.5 0.2
1 68.4 21.1 5.3 5.3
2 3.4 13.8 62.1 17.2 3.4
3 4.0 20.0 76.0
4 2.7 12.3 84.9
5 1.2 7.3 91.5
Notes: Tables show transitions in years of schooling from the baseline to the counterfactual.
Rows represent years at college in the baseline simulation, and columns represent years at
college in counterfactual simulations. Units in percentage (%). Subsidy rate is 0.5.
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Table 1.10: Counterfactual 1: Transition of Total Years at College
(a) Years at 2-year Colleges at 26
Counterfactual 1
Years 0 1 2 3 3+
Baseline
0 80.0 13.3 5.1 1.2 0.4
1 1.1 34.7 21.1 26.3 16.8
2 1.7 20.7 34.5 43.1
3 3.3 13.3 83.3
(b) Years at 4-year Colleges at 26
Counterfactual 1
Years 0 1 2 3 4 5
Baseline
0 97.2 1.9 0.5 0.2 0.2
1 73.7 15.8 5.3 5.3
2 27.6 3.4 48.3 13.8 3.4 3.4
3 2.0 6.0 14.0 72.0 4.0 2.0
4 4.1 2.7 12.3 79.5 1.4
5 1.2 4.9 13.4 78.0
Notes: Tables show transitions in years of schooling from the baseline to the counterfactual.
Rows represent years at college in the baseline simulation, and columns represent years at
college in counterfactual simulations. Units in percentage (%). Subsidy rate is 1, i.e., free
community college.
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Table 1.11: Counterfactual 2: Transition of Total Years at College
(a) Years at 2-year Colleges at 26
Counterfactual 2
Years 0 1 2 3 3+
Baseline
0 93.3 4.3 1.2 0.6 0.6
1 71.6 14.7 10.5 3.2
2 55.2 19.0 25.9
3 3.3 3.3 30.0 63.3
(b) Years at 4-year Colleges at 26
Counterfactual 2
Years 0 1 2 3 4 5
Baseline
0 97.0 2.1 0.7 0.2
1 42.1 26.3 15.8 15.8
2 13.8 3.4 72.4 6.9 3.4
3 2.0 4.0 14.0 72.0 6.0 2.0
4 5.5 4.1 13.7 76.7
5 7.3 12.2 80.5
Notes: Tables show transitions in years of schooling from the baseline to the counterfactual.
Rows represent years at college in the baseline simulation, and columns represent years at
college in counterfactual simulations. Units in percentage (%).
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Figure 1.1: NLSY97 Sample Choices
Notes: Data: NLSY97 sample; Observations = 751.
33
Figure 1.2: Model Fit: 2-year College
Notes: Data: NLSY97 sample; Model: simulated data.
34
Figure 1.3: Model Fit: 4-year College
Notes: Data: NLSY97 sample; Model: simulated data.
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Figure 1.4: Model Fit: Work
Notes: Data: NLSY97 sample; Model: simulated data.
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Figure 1.5: Model Fit: 4-year College Degree
Notes: Data: NLSY97 sample; Model: simulated data.
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Figure 1.6: Model Fit: Average Years of Schooling
Notes: Data: NLSY97 sample; Model: simulated data.
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Figure 1.7: Counterfactual 1. Half Tuition Subsidy: 2-year College
Notes: Simulated data from counterfactual 1. Subsidy rate = 0.5
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Figure 1.8: Counterfactual 1. Half Tuition Subsidy: 4-year College
Notes: Simulated data from counterfactual 1. Subsidy rate = 0.5
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Figure 1.9: Counterfactual 1. Half Tuition Subsidy: Work
Notes: Simulated data from counterfactual 1. Subsidy rate = 0.5
41
Figure 1.10: Counterfactual 1. Half Tuition Subsidy: 4-year College Degree
Notes: Simulated data from counterfactual 1. Subsidy rate = 0.5
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Figure 1.11: Counterfactual 1. Full Tuition Subsidy: 2-year College
Notes: Simulated data from counterfactual 1. Subsidy rate = 1
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Figure 1.12: Counterfactual 1. Full Tuition Subsidy: 4-year College
Notes: Simulated data from counterfactual 1. Subsidy rate = 1
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Figure 1.13: Counterfactual 1. Full Tuition Subsidy: Work
Notes: Simulated data from counterfactual 1. Subsidy rate = 1
45
Figure 1.14: Counterfactual 1. Full Tuition Subsidy: 4-year College Degree
Notes: Simulated data from counterfactual 1. Subsidy rate = 1
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Figure 1.15: Counterfactual 2. Easier Transition to 4-year Colleges: 2-year College
Notes: Simulated data when a year at a 2-year college is equivalent to a year at a 4-year
college.
47
Figure 1.16: Counterfactual 2. Easier Transition to 4-year Colleges: 4-year College
Notes: Simulated data when a year at a 2-year college is equivalent to a year at a 4-year
college.
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Figure 1.17: Counterfactual 2. Easier Transition to 4-year Colleges: Work
Notes: Simulated data when a year at a 2-year college is equivalent to a year at a 4-year
college.
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Figure 1.18: Counterfactual 2. Easier Transition to 4-year Colleges: 4-year College Degree
Notes: Simulated data when a year at a 2-year college is equivalent to a year at a 4-year
college.
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Chapter 2
Quality of Public High Schools and
Educational Choices
2.1 Introduction
Public high schools in the U.S. are largely funded by local property taxes, and the school
funding formula relies on property taxes. As a result, high-income school districts have
more educational resources than low-income school districts. Suppose different levels of
funding cause the quality of high schools through different factors, and local school districts
or the federal government were to achieve the goal of improving school quality. What would
happen to students’ educational outcomes given this improvement? For example, Illinois
plans to make school funding more equitable by allocating more funding to districts with
low property values. High school quality seems to make difference for student performance
and educational choices, but it is difficult to identify the causal relationship between quality
and outcome. The main challenge is that it is difficult to find an exogenous variation in
schooling inputs to estimate a causal effect.
This paper investigates the effect of public school quality on students’ enrollment deci-
sions and their academic achievements in college. I investigate how school quality affects
observable educational choices by estimating a structural model. I use a structural model to
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quantify the effect of high school quality on students’ educational choices for an outcome-
based analysis. This paper focuses on school performance instead of schooling inputs that
may affect students’ performance. I investigate college enrollment and post-secondary edu-
cation completion rates when the school quality were to change across schools.
I use the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 to create a measure of high
school quality by taking the average of the standardized test scores for students at each
school. In my model of college enrollment and continuation choices, the quality of high
schools directly affects students’ SAT scores, the probabilities of being admitted to high-
quality colleges, and college grades.
The first counterfactual results show that centralizing public education results in a higher
college enrollment rate of students from a low-quality school districts. Because of the strong
correlation between quality of high school and family income level, those who benefit most
from this counterfactual policy are the students enrolled in a low-quality high school located
in a low-income district. I find that college enrollment increases by 19.8 percent and college
completion increases by 17.6 percent for the students from the lowest quartile quality schools.
Secondly, when a policy imposes a lower bound for the high school quality, I find that college
enrollment increases by 9.1 percent and college completion increases by 7.8 percent for the
students attending the lowest quality quartile schools. Since the students attending the
lowest-quality schools are mostly from the lowest family income background, I find a small
increase for the low-income families. Lastly, a 10 percent increase in the ability of students
from the lowest 25th percentile quality schools increases enrollment and completion by 59.5
percent and 33.3 percent, respectively. In addition, this counterfactual policy increases
enrollment by 27.6 percent and completion by 16.1 percent for a group of students from a
family income below $35,000. Compared to a direct increase in the ability of the students,
an increase in the quality of public schools has a modest effect on college enrollment and
completion.
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Many previous studies focus on how different factors affect the school quality and aca-
demic achievement, but the results are mixed (See Hanushek (1986) and Hedges et al (1994)).
Examples of specific schooling inputs that have been widely discussed include: reducing the
class size (Krueger (2003)), adopting the school accountability systems (Kane and Staiger
(2002) and Jacob (2005)), increasing the school choice options (Hastings et al (2005)), reform-
ing the school finance system (Card and Payne (2002) and Guryan (2003)), and improving
teacher quality (Rivkin et al (2005)). This paper differs from the existing literature by fo-
cusing on the student performance as a measure of school quality. I measure a high school
quality by taking the average of the standardized test scores for students at each school.
In terms of the model choice, this paper is related to structural models used in Arcidia-
cono (2005) and Stange (2012) in the context of higher education. Arcidiacono estimates a
structural model where students apply to college, choose where to attend, and choose what
subject to major in, while the schools select students for admission and financial aid offers.
To understand how the quality of schools affects the educational choices, this paper adds
quality of high school to potentially affect the SAT score, college quality, and college grades.
Quality of high schools indirectly affects educational choices through a SAT score, college
quality, and college grades.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the data and
descriptive analysis. Section 2.3 describes the model, and Section 2.4 explains the estimation
strategy. Section 2.5 presents the estimation results and the model fit . Section 2.6 discusses
the policy counterfactuals targeting high school qualities. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Data Construction
I use the restricted-use version of the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS88).
In the spring of 1988, the NELS88 surveyed 24,599 8th grade students attending 1,052 high
schools in the U.S. The follow-up surveys were conducted in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000.
The third follow-up survey (1994) contains data for participants who would be sophomores
if they decided to attend college after graduating from a high school. The fourth follow-up
survey (2000) provides data for participants who would have either graduated or dropped
out if they went to college. The NELS88 surveys from 1992, 1994, and 2000 fit well with
the timeline of the model in which students make decisions to enroll in college and to stay
or drop out.
I restrict the sample to male high school seniors who graduated as the class of 1992 and
participated in follow-up surveys in 1994 and 2000. I use the transcript data to determine
whether an individual dropped out at certain year or completed college. Transfers are not
considered in the sample. Total number of the sample is 1914.
I obtain both student and school level data from the NELS88 data set. Student level
data includes college grades, enrollment and drop-out status, standardized mathematics test
scores, SAT scores, and family income. I compute the cumulative grades using transcript
data, and I use standardized mathematics scores tested in the base-year survey as a measure
of ability. School level data includes the key variable, high school quality, college quality, and
tuition costs. To have a standardized measure of the quality throughout public high schools,
I take the average of the standardized mathematics test scores for enrolled students if a high
school have more than 16 students in the sample. The number of high schools in the sample
is 600. I use 13,825 observations to compute qualities of 600 high schools in this sample.
To measure college quality, I use the percentile SAT scores of incoming students for a given
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college in 1992 obtained by linking the NELS88 data set to the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS).
Since the NELS88 data set has limited income data for a short period of time after college,
it is difficult to estimate the expected income and to project this value to an individual’s
retirement age of 65. To supplement the NELS88, I estimate the expected lifetime income
using the data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). I assume
that individuals in my sample from the NELS88 look at the income from NLSY79 to form
expectations about their future earnings.
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables in the model. I divide the full
sample of students into two groups based on quality level of the high school they attended.
The first two columns display the sample means of variables in the full sample. The next
two columns represent students who enrolled in college, and the last two columns show the
sample means of the students who completed college. A pattern showing a high percentage of
enrollment, completion, math scores, high-income, and non-black and non-Hispanic ethnicity
remain the same regardless of educational status. Probabilities for enrollment and completion
are higher for the students from better quality high schools. Moreover, the correlation
between the family income and high school quality illustrates the fact that the U.S. public
education system depends on local property taxes.
Figures 2.2-2.4 illustrate qualities of high schools in the data. Figure 2.2 shows the density
of a high school quality in the sample. The mean is 51.27, and the standard deviation is 5.2.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the fraction of family income levels within each school quality quartile.
For example, the fraction of the highest family income category is 43.97 percent if a high
school quality is the highest, whereas the same fraction drops to 5.2 percent if a high school
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quality is the lowest. Except for the lowest and the highest family income categories, there
is enough variation in family income for each school quality quartile.
Figure 2.4 plots the probability of college enrollment and completion for each high school
quality quartile. I find a positive correlation between enrollment and completion probabilities
and high school quality.
2.3 Model
The structural model consists of two stages, and individuals make at most four choices: an
enrollment decision Et=1 and three continuation decisionsDt when they are enrolled in college
(2 ≤ t ≤ 4). Figure 2.1 displays the timeline of the model. The model allows individuals to
drop out and start working at the beginning of sophomore, junior, and senior year. If an
individual decides not to attend college or drop out of college, the individual starts working
and makes no further schooling choices.
High school quality affects the enrollment decision through two channels. First, it affects
the quality of college admitted, SAT score, and college grades. It is likely that high quality
schools better prepare students academically for college-level studies. Second, high schools
affect their students by informing about the college option, such as college counseling. This
model partly captures this effect by allowing qhs to affect the utility of attending a college.
In the first stage, an individual decides to attend college or to work based on the quality of
high school qhs and the ability Ai as measured by the a standardized mathematics test score.
SAT score is determined by one’s ability Ai, high school quality qhs, and family income yfam.
Given a SAT score and individual- and school-level characteristics, the quality of college qc is
determined. If an individual decides to attend college, the first-year grade Gi1 is determined
conditional on individual characteristics Ai, qhs, SATi, yfam, race, and quality of college. I
do not model the application and admission process explicitly.
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In the second stage, conditional on the enrollment an individual decides whether to stay
or drop out of college depending on the individual and school-level characteristics and the
grade Git. I assume that students cannot come back to college after dropping out.
2.3.1 Preference
Utility of enrolling in college c of quality qc is the following
ui (qc) = u¯i (Xi, Zc;αx, αw) + i,c
Xi is a vector of individual characteristics including qhs, ability, SAT score, GPA, family
income, race, and type r. Zc is a vector of college-level characteristics such as qc and the net
cost. I assume that i,c follows a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution.
It is likely that there exist information only observed by a student when making decisions
in the model. Let αi be the individual specific preference for a college option. If there exists
only one type of individuals then αi is the same for all i. When I allow for unobserved
heterogeneity and add multiple types of individuals, αi depends on type r. I assume that
the probability of being a certain type depends on the family income. Probability of being
a type r is
Pr (typei = r) = Λ (γ0 + γ1low inci)
where Λ (·) is the logistic function.
2.3.2 Labor Market
At t = 5, individuals who finish college enter the labor market. Value of starting to work at
time t = 5 is
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Vs=2,t=5 (qc, Gi, 2,5) = V
0
2,5 (qc, Gi) + 02,5
= λ
65∑
τ=t+17
βτ−t−17yiτ + 02,5
where V 02,t is the expected present value of lifetime income net of unobservable preference
when i starts working at t. Throughout the model, I assume that both 0s,t and 1s,t follow
a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution. yiτ is the expected income of τ -year old individual
i at time t (τ = t+ 17). This income depends on the schooling choices. For individuals
who decided to attend college and graduate (Et=1 = 1 and Dt = 1,∀t ≥ 2) (i.e., college
graduates), income at age τ is
yiτ = yiτ (qc, Git, t, sit, Xi) , t ≥ 5
where sit is the total number of years spent at college, and Xi includes gender, race, and
age.
2.3.3 Stage 2: College Continuation
I solve the model backwards starting from the last period (t = 4) in the second stage. In this
stage, if there exist a period t such that present value of lifetime utility of staying in school
is lower than that of working, an individual drops out of college at t and goes to work. An
individual makes at most three choices in this stage.
At t = {2, 3, 4}, an individual enrolled in college compares the present value of lifetime
utilities of staying (Dit = 1) and the value of outside option to work (Dit = 0):
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Vs=2,t (qc, Git, t, 2,t) = max
{
V
1
2,t (qc, Git) + 12,t;V
0
2,t (qc, Git) + 02,t
}
Value of staying at college at time t is
V
1
2,t (qc, Git) + 12,t = u (qc) + βE
[
V2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1), t+ 1, 2,t+1
)
| Dit = 1, qc, Git
]
+ 12,t
where the expectation is taken over the future cumulative grade Gi(t+1) and 2,t+1’s. I can
rewrite the expectation term as
E
[
max
{
V
1
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
)
+ 12,t+1;V
0
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
)
+ 02,t+1
}
| Dit = 1, qc, Git
]
=
∑
Gi(t+1)
E
[
max
{
V
1
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
)
+ 12,t+1;V
0
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
)
+ 02,t+1
}
| Dit = 1, qc
]
·Pr
(
Gi(t+1) | Git, qhs, qc, Ai, SATi
)
Rust (1987) showed that this expectation expression has a following closed form solution:
E
[
max
{
V
1
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
)
+ 12,t+1;V
0
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
)
+ 02,t+1
}
| Dit = 1, qc
]
= γ + ln
[
exp
(
V
1
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
))
+ exp
(
V
0
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
))]
where γ is the Euler constant. Combining above expressions together I can rewrite V 12,t (qc, Git)
as
V
1
2,t (qc, Git) = u (qc)+β
∑
Gi(t+1)
{
γ + ln
[
exp
(
V
1
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
))
+ exp
(
V
0
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
))]}
·Pr
(
Gi(t+1) | Git, qhs, qc, Ai, SATi
)
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Value of dropping out and getting a job at time t is
V
0
2,t (qc, Git) + 02,t = λ
65∑
τ=t+17
βτ−t−17yiτ (qc, Git, Ai, t, Xi) + 02,t
where V 02,t is the present value of lifetime income net of unobservable preference when i starts
working at t. An individual chooses to stay in college if V 12,t (qc, Git)+12,t ≥ V 02,t (qc, Git)+02,t.
The probability of staying in college is
Pr (Dit = 1) =
exp
(
V
1
2,t
)
exp
(
V
1
2,t
)
+ exp
(
V
0
2,t
) , 2 ≤ t ≤ 4
2.3.4 SAT Score, College Quality, and College Grades
When an individual decides to attend college, a SAT score is drawn from a probability dis-
tribution based on Xhs = {qhs, Ai, yfam, sex, race}. I discretize SAT scores into J categories
and assume that SATi follows the logit probabilities.
Pr (SATi = j | Ei = 1, qhs, Ai, yfam, female) = exp (Xhsρj)∑J
l=1 exp (Xhsρl)
I characterize colleges by their qualities and discretize into L categories. The lowest
category, L = 1, belongs to the two-year colleges since most of them have an open admissions
policy. I assume that the school’s optimal admission rule results in logit probabilities. The
probability of being accepted to a L = l quality college is
Pr (qc = l | Ei = 1, qhs, Ai, SATi, yfam, female) = exp (Xcδl)∑L
j=1 exp (Xcδj)
where Xc is a vector of school and individual characteristics including qhs, Ai, yfam, female,
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and SATi.
Conditional on the enrollment, the model determines the first-year college grade. I dis-
cretize cumulative grades Git into K values. Let G∗it = X ′gη + νi be a latent variable for
Git. Define Git = g(k) if µk−1 < G∗it < µk where µ0 = −∞, µK =∞, and g(k) being the kth
possible grade. I assume that νi follows a standard normal distribution. Using the result
from the ordered probit model, the probability of Git = g(k) is the following for 2 ≤ t ≤ 4:
Pr
(
Git = g(k) | Xg =
(
Gi(t−1), t ·Gi(t−1), qhs, qc, Ai, SATi, female
))
= Φ (µk −Xgη)− Φ (µk−1 −Xgη) , 1 ≤ k ≤ K
where µk is a threshold parameter strictly increasing in k, and Φ is a cumulative distribution
function of a standard normal distribution.
In the case of the first-year grade, Xg does not include previous cumulative grade and its
interaction with time t, Gi(t−1) and t·Gi(t−1). I estimate two sets of threshold parameters µk’s
separately: one for freshman year and another common set of thresholds among sophomores,
juniors, and seniors.
2.3.5 Stage 1: College Enrollment
In the first stage (t = 1), an individual chooses to attend college or not by comparing the
present value of lifetime utilities from attending college (Ei = 1) and working (Ei = 0):
Vs=1,t=1 (qhs, Ai, yfam) = max
{
V
1
1,t (qhs, Ai, yfam) + 11,t;V
0
1,t (qhs, Ai, yfam) + 01,t
}
Value of enrolling in college is
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V
1
s=1,t=1 (qhs, Ai) + 11,t =
∑
SATi
∑
qc
∑
Gi1
{u (qc) + βE [Vs=2,t+1 (qc, Git+1, t+ 1, 2,t+1) | qhs, Ai]}
×Pr (Gi1 | qhs, qc, Ai, SATi)× Pr (qc | enroll−college = 1, qhs, Ai, SATi, yfam)
×Pr (SATi | enroll−college = 1, qhs, Ai, yfam) + 11,t
Similar to the stage 2, I replace the conditional expectation term with the following closed
form expression and rewrite V 1s=1,t=1 (qhs, Ai) as
V
1
s=1,t=1 (qhs, Ai) =
∑
SATi
∑
qc
∑
Git
{
u (qc) + γ + ln
[
exp
(
V
1
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
))
+ exp
(
V
0
2,t+1
(
qc, Gi(t+1)
))]}
×Pr
(
Gi(t=1) | qhs, qc, Ai, SATi
)
× Pr (qc | enroll−college = 1, qhs, Ai, SATi, yfam)
×Pr (SATi | enroll−college = 1, qhs, Ai, yfam)
Value of starting to work is
V
0
1,t (qhs, Ai) + 01,t = λ
65∑
τ=18
βτ−18yiτ (Ai, Xi) + 01,t
An individual decides to enroll if V 11,t (qhs, Ai, yfam) + 11,t ≥ V 01,t (qhs, Ai, yfam) + 01,t. The
probability of enrolling in college is
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Pr (Ei = 1) =
exp
(
V
1
1,t
)
exp
(
V
1
1,t
)
+ exp
(
V
0
1,t
) , t = 1
2.4 Estimation
2.4.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The model is estimated with maximum likelihood. The outcomes of the model are Ei, SATi,
qc, Dit, and Git, college enrollment, SAT score, college quality, continuation decision, and
college grades, respectively. I categorize the parameters θ into two groups: utility parameters
θu and transition parameters θf .
Table 2.2 lists the structural parameters of the model. Utility parameters include αE, αD,
and αc. Note that utility parameters include coefficient on unobserved types. Transition
parameters include coefficients on Xhs and on Xc, grade threshold parameters µ’s and coef-
ficients on Xg, η’s, and the parameters of the probability of being type r.
Individual likelihood contribution is
Li (θ) = Pr (Ei | qhsi , Ai, yfam)× f (SATi | Ei = 1, qhsi , Ai, yfam)
×
R∑
r=1
{f (qci | Ei = 1, qhsi , Ai, SATi, yfam)× f (Gi1 | qci , Ei = 1, qhsi , Ai, SATi, yfam)
×
4∏
t=2
[Pr (Dit | Git, qci , Ei = 1, qhsi , Ai, SATi, yfam, typei)
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× f
(
Git | Gi(t−1), qci , Ei = 1, qhsi , Ai, SATi, yfam
)]}
Pr (typei = r)
The maximum likelihood estimator θˆMLE maximizes the log-likelihood function L,
θˆMLE = arg max
θ
log
[∏
i
Li (θ)
]
Decisions in each stage additively contribute to the total likelihood function. Hence,
I can break down the log-likelihood function L = log [∏i Li (θ)] into separate likelihood
contributions.
L (θ) = LSAT (ρ) + Lqc (δ) + LG1 (µG1,1, . . . , µG1,K−1, ηG1)
+LG (µ1, . . . , µK−1, η) + LD (αD, αc, λ, µ1, . . . , µK−1, η)
+LE (αE, αD, αc, λ, ρ, δ, µG1,1, . . . , µG1,K−1, ηG1 , µ1, . . . , µK−1, η)
I first obtain the estimates of transition parameters
(
ρˆ, δˆ, µˆ′s, ηˆ
)
by maximizing LSAT ,
Lqc , LG1 , and LG then use the estimates to estimate utility parameters (αE, αD, αc, λ).
2.4.2 Identification
Utility and type parameters are identified by the variation in choices of students including
dropout and continuation decisions. I use the average tuition level of students’ residence in
high school which is assumed to be independent of unobserved type to identify the parameter
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on the cost. I control for various individual characteristics including an ability measure, test
score, family background, and demographics. If two individuals have similar characteristics,
the model would predict that they should make the same choices over time. If the model
prediction does not match the data, I would attribute the difference to the unobserved
heterogeneity which is only observed to each individual when making choices.
Transition parameters including SAT scores, college grades, and college quality are esti-
mated outside the model. I assume that unobserved types affect these outcomes indirectly
through educational choices. This is a stronger assumption then allowing unobserved het-
erogeneity to affect these outcomes directly. Under this assumption, I use the observed data
from the NELS88 to estimate the transition parameters.
2.5 Results
The model results match the overall data pattern quite well. Figure 2.5 shows the educational
choices over time of the full sample. Individuals gradually work more and enroll in college
less. Figure 2.6 displays the schooling choice transitions. The model matches the educational
outcomes in the data by high school quality and by different educational groups as shown in
Figures 2.7 and 2.8. The model results for the SAT scores and GPA show patterns similar
to the actual data. Given that a student is enrolled in college, the math score is higher,
the fraction of low family income background is lower, and the fraction of non-black and
non-Hispanic population is higher in the simulated data set as in the actual data set from
the NELS88. This outcome is similar for the group of students who completed college as
shown in Figure 2.8.
As discussed in the estimation section, I first estimate the transition parameters and
then I take the estimates as given to estimate the utility parameters. Tables 2.3-2.6 present
the estimates of the transition parameters in the order of SAT score, college quality, and
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first-year grade. Then I present the utility and type parameter estimates in Tables 2.7 and
2.8, respectively.
2.5.1 Transition Parameters
SAT score An individual’s SAT score is determined conditional on the enrollment decision
and individual- and school-level characteristics. I discretize the scores into three categories
with J = 3 being the highest score. Cutoff points are (0, 400, 600, 800). Table 2.3 presents the
logit SAT estimates. Both the individual ability and the high school quality have a positive
effect on the probability of achieving the highest SAT score (J = 3). Family income and
race do not have a statistically significant effect on the probabilities of receiving the highest
SAT score (J = 3). Figure 2.9 shows the probabilities of receiving a SAT score between
400 and 600. A non-Hispanic and non-black student with a mean ability from a low-income
background has 49 percent and 85 percent chances of receiving a SAT score between 400 and
600 when attending a high school quality of 40 and 60, respectively. The same student from
a high-income background has 54 percent and 84 percent chances of achieving the same SAT
score when attending a school quality of 40 and 60, respectively.
College quality Conditional on the enrollment decision and a SAT score, a college quality
is determined by logit probabilities. I allow the college quality to be low or high. Table 2.4
shows the logit college quality estimates. An individual’s SAT score and ability have a
positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of acceptance to a high-quality
college. Coefficients on race and family income are not statistically significant. Figure 2.10
displays the adjusted prediction of the logit result.
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College grades Conditional on the enrollment, a SAT score, and college quality, the first-
year grade is determined by the ordered probit probabilities. I discretize the grades into four
values with K = 4 being the highest grade. Cutoff points are (0, 1, 2, 3, 4). Table 2.5 presents
the first-year grade estimates. The individual’s ability and a SAT score have a positive effect
on the probability of earning a higher grade. Coefficient on a high school quality is no longer
statistically significant, but the quality does have an indirect effect on the grade through a
SAT score and quality of college. Coefficients on race are not statistically significant. Upper
class grade estimates are shown in Table 2.6. After controlling for previous grades in college,
the quality of high school no longer has a statistically significant effect.
2.5.2 Utility and Type Parameters
I obtain utility parameter estimates after taking the estimates of the transition parameters
as given. Table 2.7 shows the parameter estimates and standard errors.1 Quality of high
school has a positive effect on the utility of college enrollment. Attending a high-quality
college yields a large positive utility benefit. Parameter on a type 1 has a positive effect on
attending college implying that a large portion of educational choice is not explainable by
observed characteristics. A type 1 individual is more likely to attend college than a type 2
individual, holding other individual characteristics constant. A Hispanic student has a more
negative utility than a non-Hispanic and non-black student. A black student has a slightly
positive utility compared to a non-Hispanic and non-black student.
Table 2.8 shows type parameter estimates and standard errors. The probabilities of being
type 1 for a student from low- or high-income are 42.4 percent and 59.7 percent, respectively.
1Standard errors are calculated through bootstrapping procedure with 1000 replications.
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2.6 Policy Counterfactuals
After estimating the model, I investigate the outcomes generated from the model simulations.
In the model, public school quality directly affects the probability of receiving a high SAT
score, the probability of entering a high-quality college, and the probability of getting a higher
first-year grade. Thus, public school quality affects the educational outcomes by affecting
students’ college preparedness. This section discusses three policies regarding public high
school quality to understand the effect of school quality on students’ educational outcomes.
2.6.1 Uniform Quality
The first counterfactual investigates a hypothetical policy which restricts the quality of
public schools to ensure uniformity regardless of the school districts. More centralized public
education system and more equal distribution of school funding would have less variation in
quality among schools. I restrict the quality of public schools at the median level and simulate
and track students’ educational choices. Then I compare the enrollment and dropout rates
with the baseline result.
Centralizing public education results in a higher college enrollment rate of students from
low-quality school districts as shown in Figure 2.11 (a). If quality of a high school is far
below from the median, increases in enrollment and completion is higher. I find that college
enrollment increases by 19.8 percent and college completion increases by 17.6 percent for
the students from the lowest quartile quality schools. Enrollment and completion slightly
decrease for the students from the top 50th percentile quality schools. Figure 2.11 (b) plots
the counterfactual result by family income level. Because of the high correlation between
quality of high school and family income level, those who benefit most from this counter-
factual policy are the students enrolled in a low-quality high school located in a low-income
district.
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2.6.2 Lower Bound
The second counterfactual analyzes the effect of a quality threshold for high schools. This
policy is more feasible than the first counterfactual that the government could impose this
cutoff by providing incentives, direct subsidies, or penalties such as in the No Child Left
Behind Act. As described in the introduction, Illinois plans to allocate more funding to
districts with low property values, which would potentially have a positive effect on the
students in low-quality schools.
I fix the qualities of the lowest quartile high schools to the 25 percentile level (qhs = 48.69).
Figure 2.12 (a) displays the changes in choices for students by high school quality quartile.
Because this model is a partial equilibrium model in which students do not compete for
seats in college, students attending high schools with quality above the 25th percentile do
not alter their choices. For the bottom 25th percentile schools, I find that college enrollment
increases by 9.1 percent and college completion increases by 7.8 percent. Figure 2.12 (b)
shows the counterfactual result by family income level. Since the students attending the
lowest-quality schools are mostly from the lowest family income background, I find a small
increase for low-income families.
2.6.3 Increase in Ability
The third counterfactual investigates a 10 percent increase in the ability of students from
the lowest 25th percentile quality schools instead of changing quality of high schools. To
understand the effect of the ability, I assume that a high school quality does not change due to
the increase in individuals’ abilities. Figure 2.13 displays the changes in choices by high school
quality and by family income level. Figure 2.13 (a) illustrates that a student from a lowest-
quality quartile experiences an increase of 59.5 percent and 33.3 percent for enrollment and
completion, respectively. For a student from the second lowest-quality quartile, enrollment
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and completion rate increase by 29.5 percent and 31.6 percent. Figure 2.13 (b) shows that
directly affecting the ability measure benefits the high-income families, as well. In particular,
this policy increases enrollment by 27.6 percent and completion by 16.1 percent for a group
of students from a family income below $35,000. This amount is the largest increase among
three counterfactuals for this particular family income category. Similar to the second policy
counterfactual, since a college market is not modeled, this relatively large effect does not
consider the fact that the seats at colleges are limited especially for high-quality colleges.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates how public school quality affects post-secondary school enrollment
and completion decisions. In the first stage of the model, an individual chooses to attend
college or to work. Conditional on the enrollment, an individual makes continuation decisions
while staying in college. I estimate the model with maximum likelihood, and given the
estimates, I perform three policy simulations regarding the changes in the quality of high
school.
The counterfactual results show that centralizing public education results in a higher
college enrollment rate of students from low-quality school districts. Because of the strong
correlation between quality of public schools and family income level, those who benefit most
from this counterfactual policy are the students enrolled in a low-quality high school located
in a low-income district. When a policy imposes a lower bound for the high school quality,
I find that college enrollment increases by 9.1 percent and the college completion increases
by 7.8 percent for the students attending the lowest quality quartile schools. Lastly, a 10
percent increase in the ability of students from the lowest 25th percentile quality schools
increases enrollment and completion by 59.5 percent and 33.3 percent, respectively. The
counterfactual results suggest that improvement in the quality of public schools has a modest
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effect on college enrollment and completion compared to a direct increase in the ability of
the students.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Sample Means
Full Sample Enrolled Completed
High school quality Low High Low High Low High
Prob. of enrolling 0.58 0.79
Prob. of completing 0.38 0.59 0.65 0.74
Standardized math test 52.13 58.50 55.01 59.72 56.57 60.47
[9.52] [9.64] [9.42] [9.22] [9.55] [8.98]
Low family income 0.45 0.24 0.36 0.20 0.33 0.67
Non-black & non-Hispanic 0.75 0.91 0.80 0.92 0.81 0.93
Observations 959 955 561 762 366 564
Notes: Full sample is the high school class of 1992 who participated in 3rd and 4th follow-up
surveys. Enrolled sample is the individuals enrolled in full time public or private colleges
among the full sample. Completed sample is the individuals who received a bachelor’s degree
or higher as of 2000. High school quality grouped into high if qhs is greater than the median
(qhs = 52.33). Low family income equals 1 if a household income is less than $35,000 in 1991
dollars. Standard deviations are shown in brackets.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Structural Parameters
Utility Parameters θu Transition Parameters θf
Variable Parameter Variable Parameter
Enrollment qhs α1 SAT (J sets) qhs ρ1
choice Ai α2 Ai ρ2
qc α3 yfam (5) ρ3
SATi α4 race (3) ρ4
Git α5 constant ρ0
yfam α6 College quality SATi δ1
race α7 qhs δ2
cost α8 Ai δ3
type 1 α9 yfam (5) δ4
constant α0 race (3) δ5
constant δ0
First-year qc ηG1,1
grade SATi (J = 3) ηG1,2
qhs ηG1,3
Ai ηG1,4
race (3) ηG1,5
thresholds µG1
Cumulative qc η1
grade SATi (J = 3) η2
(2nd to 4th-year) qhs η3
Ai η4
race (3) η5
Gi(t−1) (K = 4) η7
thresholds µ
Type type 1 γ1
probabilities constant γ0
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Table 2.3: Logit SAT Estimates
J = 1 (Lowest) J = 3 (Highest)
Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error
High school quality qhs -0.077 0.020 0.050 0.022
Ability Ai -0.198 0.014 0.254 0.020
Family income category 2 0.281 0.315 0.167 0.493
Family income category 3 0.255 0.305 0.081 0.487
Family income category 4 -0.009 0.303 0.609 0.466
Family income category 5 (Highest) -0.505 0.350 0.694 0.460
Race: black 0.591 0.350 -1.673 1.205
Race: non-black & non-Hispanic -0.393 0.430 -0.124 0.521
Constant 13.820 0.285 -21.033 1.818
Notes: J = 2 is the base outcome. Hispanic is the baseline race. Number of observation is
1323.
Table 2.4: Logit College Quality Estimates
J = 2 (High)
Estimates Standard Error
SAT score category 2 0.908 0.173
SAT score category 3 (Highest) 2.614 0.478
High school quality qhs 0.022 0.016
Ability Ai 0.032 0.010
Family income category 2 -0.380 0.254
Family income category 3 -0.173 0.247
Family income category 4 -0.107 0.247
Family income category 5 (Highest) 0.380 0.277
Race: black 0.271 0.364
Race: non-black & non-Hispanic -0.099 0.247
Constant -2.548 0.868
Notes: J = 1 is the base outcome. Hispanic is the baseline race. Number of observation is
1323.
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Table 2.5: Ordered Probit First-year Grade Estimates
Estimates Standard Error
High-quality college 0.004 0.072
SAT score category 2 0.333 0.088
SAT score category 3 (Highest) 0.649 0.143
High school quality qhs 0.002 0.006
Ability Ai 0.018 0.004
Race: black 0.001 0.174
Race: non-black & non-Hispanic 0.158 0.115
Threshold µG1,1 -0.024 0.370
Threshold µG1,2 1.056 0.369
Threshold µG1,3 2.375 0.373
Notes: Number of observation is 1323. Hispanic is the baseline race.
Table 2.6: Ordered Probit Year 2-4 Grade Estimates
Estimates Standard Error
High-quality college 0.069 0.052
SAT score category2 0.265 0.062
SAT score category 3 (Highest) 0.478 0.098
High school quality qhs -0.005 0.004
Ability Ai 0.009 0.003
Race: black -0.125 0.118
Race: non-black & non-Hispanic 0.176 0.080
Previous grade category 2 0.272 0.134
Previous grade category 3 0.971 0.131
Previous grade category 4 (Highest) 2.132 0.137
Threshold µG1,1 -0.337 0.279
Threshold µG1,2 0.856 0.280
Threshold µG1,3 2.428 0.282
Notes: Number of observation is 3164. Hispanic is the baseline race. Ordered probit esti-
mates obtained from pooled data of colleges grades from year 2 to 4.
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Table 2.7: Utility Parameter Estimates
Variable Estimates Standard Error
High school quality qhs 0.043 0.0017
Ability Ai 0.007 0.0034
High-quality college 0.835 0.0360
SAT score category 2 0.020 0.0414
SAT score category 3 (Highest) 0.480 44.2960
Current GPA 1.117 0.0295
Low family income -0.519 0.1046
Race: Hispanic 0.148 0.0735
Race: black 0.432 0.1375
Cost -3.090 0.0524
Constant -1.474 0.2720
PDV of yiτ 5.593 0.3372
Type 1 1.420 0.6376
Notes: Total number of sample is 1914. Non-black and non-Hispanic is the baseline race.
Standard errors are calculated through bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Table 2.8: Probability of Type Parameter Estimates
Variable Estimates Standard Error
Constant 0.393 0.1380
Low income -0.697 0.2798
Notes: Total number of sample is 1914. Standard errors are calculated through bootstrapping
with 1000 replications.
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Figure 2.1: Model Timeline
Notes: Students make at most 4 decisions. If a students drops out before t = 4, then one
starts to work.
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Figure 2.2: High School Quality Density
Notes: Total number of high schools in the sample is 600. I use 13,825 observations to
compute high school qualities in this sample.
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Figure 2.3: Family Income by High School Quality
Notes: Family income category 1: below $19, 999; 2: [$20, 000, $34, 999]; 3:
[$35, 000, $49, 999]; 4: [$50, 000, $74, 999]; 5: above $75, 000.
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Figure 2.4: Probability of Enrollment and Completion
Notes: NELS88 sample.
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Figure 2.5: Model Fit: Choices Over Time
Notes: Fraction of enrollment in college over the full sample.
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Figure 2.6: Model Fit: Transition Over Time
Notes: Fraction of enrollment in college conditional on previous choice.
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Figure 2.7: Model Fit: Enrolled Sample by High School Quality
(a) SAT scores
(b) First-year grade
(c) Race
Notes: Sample enrolled in college.
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Figure 2.8: Model Fit: Completed Sample by High School Quality
(a) SAT scores
(b) First-year grade
(c) Race
Notes: Sample completed college.
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Figure 2.9: Predicted Probability of SAT Score
(a) Low family income
(b) High family income
Notes: Prob (400 ≤ SATi < 600) (a) below $35,000; (b) above $35,000. All other covariates
are fixed at mean values.
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Figure 2.10: Predicted Probability of High-quality College
(a) Low family income
(b) High family income
Notes: Prob (550 ≤ qc < 800) (a) below $35,000; (b) above $35,000. All other covariates are
fixed at mean values.
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Figure 2.11: Counterfactual 1: Choices
(a) Choices by high school quality quartile
(b) Choices by family income level
Notes: (a) High school quality quartile. 25th percentile: qhs = 48.69; 50th percentile:
qhs = 52.30; 75th percentile qhs = 55.65. (b) Low income category if a household income is
less than $35,000.
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Figure 2.12: Counterfactual 2: Choices
(a) Choices by high school quality quartile
(b) Choices by family income level
Notes: (a) High school quality quartile. 25th percentile: qhs = 48.69; 50th percentile:
qhs = 52.30; 75th percentile qhs = 55.65. (b) Low income category if a household income is
less than $35,000.
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Figure 2.13: Counterfactual 3: Choices
(a) Choices by high school quality quartile
(b) Choices by family income level
Notes: (a) High school quality quartile. 25th percentile: qhs = 48.69; 50th percentile:
qhs = 52.30; 75th percentile qhs = 55.65. (b) Low income category if a household income is
less than $35,000.
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